

**Confidential**

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# TRENDS

*in Communist Propaganda*

APPROVED FOR RELEASE  
DATE: **NOV 15 1999**

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29 October 1969  
(VOL. XX, NO. 44)

to nationalize the Gulf Oil Company, Cuba's attitude was conveyed on 24 October by the party organ GRANMA, which according to PRENSA LATINA carried a news item on "the rejection by Ovarado of the popular demands against indemnification to Gulf Oil."

#### CHILEAN ARMY MUTINY

Limited Havana radio comment on the 21 October mutiny in the Chilean army contrasts sharply with initial reaction to the earlier Peruvian and Bolivian coups and has been atypical in appearing to ascribe the revolt to the military's economic grievances and thus far avoiding any suggestion that Chilean rightists or the United States were implicated. On 3 October, a Havana domestic radio discussion program had raised the possibility of a Chilean military coup; one panelist speculated that the Chilean army might move in expectation of a "leftwing victory" in the 1970 elections but suggested that a Chilean military government "would have to pursue a reformist, nationalistic democratic" line. Havana's initial comment on last year's Peruvian coup and the one in Bolivia last month branded the perpetrators "gorillas" subservient to domestic reaction and "imperialism."

A commentator in a Havana domestic service discussion program on the 23d cited a report that a U.S. Central Intelligence Agency spokesman said the agency knew about the mutiny six weeks in advance, but did not suggest that this was evidence of U.S. involvement in the coup. Rather, he concluded that the agency sought "a kind of justification" since recently "some events have cropped up without U.S. imperialism... finding them out in time."

Assessing the significance of the mutiny, another commentator in the same broadcast said it exploded a "fealty prevalent in Chile through the years" that the armed forces are an apolitical, "nonideological" body. Two days earlier a participant in this discussion program had linked Chilean events with a broad Latin American "military movement" that had its inception with the Peruvian military coup; he concluded that the continent's military are "increasingly demanding political power, . . . some with more progressive characteristics than others."

Although Havana media noted without comment that the Chilean CP had called for support and defense of the Frei regime in the face of the military threat, they apparently failed to report a statement by the more radical, Cuban-oriented Socialist Party, which adopted a somewhat conflicting position. A 21 October information message from PRENSA LATINA's Santiago correspondent to Havana--not carried in available Cuban radio coverage of the mutiny--reported that the socialists appealed to workers "not to defend the bourgeois institutionalism but rather to mobilize to impose their social and political claims."

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In contrast to Havana, Moscow applauded the Chilean CP's efforts to assist the government in quelling the mutiny, which a 22 October TASS commentary traced to the machinations of retrogressive political forces. TASS charged that agents of "ultrarightwing reactionary forces" had "flooded barracks and instigated servicemen" to stage the rebellion out of fear that the 1970 presidential elections would result in a victory for leftist forces.

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